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summary  
Clearinghouses and central counterparties have become the backbone of financial markets by stepping 
between trades, facilitating securities trading, and derivative transactions on exchanges and over-
the-counter markets. in the literature and in practice, too, the notion of clearinghouse and central 
counterparty are used as synonyms, but there is still a slight difference that highlights their distinction. 
This paper focuses on the margin calculation methodology of these institutions and emphasizes the 
contrast between the two. Results show that although capturing the same risks, clearinghouses’ margin 
requirement is better from a procyclicality and cash flow management point of view; however, central 
counterparties margining is more prudent based on our results.
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Ssince the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009, central clearing has come a long way. Clearinghouses’ and central counterparties’ (CCPs) role in the economy 
has improved, expanding as well. Their 
main role in the market is to clear and settle 
trades. The financial crisis emphasized the 
vulnerabilities of the financial system, so the 
aim was to shape the market so the over-
the-counter (OtC) derivatives markets – 
trades outside the exchanges – and the risks 
associated with them should be handled, 
resulting in more transparency, so these 
trades were aimed to be cleared through these 
market infrastructures. The efficiency of the 
central clearing was proven by the winding-
down process of the Lehman Brothers, 
demonstrating that OtC transactions carried 
a considerable counterparty risk. steps were 
taken to avoid the repetition of such intense 
stress, and regulators realized the importance 
of decreasing counterparty risk during 
trading. Counterparty risk can be managed 
through clearing bilaterally or centrally 
(Gregory, 2014). during bilateral clearing, 
two trading partners enter into a master 
agreement with each other. This agreement 
has an annex, called the credit support annex 
(CsA), that requires both parties to provide 
collateral (Hull, 2018). Compared to this, if a 
CCP steps between them, then every trading 
partner is trading with the CCP, as shown on 
the right-hand side of Figure 1. The left-hand 
side shows the absence of a CCP, representing 
the bilateral clearing case.
during the summit in Pittsburgh on 26th 
september 2009, the participating G20 
leaders set a wide-ranging goal for the whole 
financial system, agreeing that all standardized 
OtC derivative contracts should be cleared 
through CCPs by the end of 2012. The other 
aim of the financial reform was to enhance 
transparency and make these contracts 
reported to trade repositories (eMiR (5), 
2012). Moreover, higher capital requirements 
were set for the non-centrally cleared OtC 
derivatives (Gregory, 2014). The regulatory 
framework for CCPs was established based 
on this agreement, so in the usA, the dodd-
Frank Wall street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (dFA) was enacted in July 
2010, while in July 2012, the european 
Market infrastructure Regulation (eMiR) in 
the european union (eu).
The Committee on Payment and Settlement 
Systems and the International Organization 
of Securities Commissions (CPss-iOsCO) 
issued the Principles of Financial Market 
Infrastructures (PFMi, 2012) in April 2012. 
The principles became the global benchmark 
for the regulatory requirement for CCPs 
(Rts (2), 2013). All standardized OtC 
trades between financial institutions must 
be cleared through a CCP. This regulation’s 
exceptions are the non-financial institutions 
if their position does not exceed the clearing 
threshold (doyle et al. 2016) in the framework 
of the eu regulation; while in the case of 
the us regulation, the non-financial firms 
are exempted if their transaction is entered 
in order to hedge commercial risk (Gregory, 
2014). Finally, foreign exchange transactions 
are exceptions, too (Hull, 2018).
The regulatory requirement, both the 
dFA and the eMiR, requires CCPs to 
manage multilevel guarantee systems. 
Market participants must pay two significant 
guarantees within this guarantee system: the 
margin and the default fund contribution – 
this latter element is called guaranty fund in 
the case of the  clearinghouses. The paper’s 
primary focus is the margin requirement 
calculation considering the requirements put 
by the regulator. The authors will analyze 
how clearinghouses and CCPs calculate the 
margin value on asset level and point out 
differences the similarities. The focus of this 
paper includes the explanation of the different 
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margin-related notions, like the variation 
margin, initial margin, maintenance margin, 
and the margin call. 
Literature review
Berndsen (2020) sums up the main academic 
findings on CCPs and classifies them into five 
main groups: the clearing itself, the optimal 
number of CCPs, the size of the default 
waterfall, the end of the default waterfall, and 
the default waterfall skin-in-the-game related 
researches. This paper focus on one element of 
the default waterfall, namely the basic notions 
of the margin calculation.
Advantages and disadvantages  
of  central clearing
Central clearing and the presence of CCPs 
proved to be effective during and after the 
global financial crisis where Lehman Brothers 
defaulted on 15th september 2008. This was 
the biggest default in CCP history (Fleming 
and sarkar, 2015; Bernstein et al., 2019), and 
the unwinding process was one of a kind. The 
‘CME closed out the cleared derivatives portfolio, 
which had a net value of around $21 billion in 
May 2008, within a few days using Lehman’s 
margin resources. The margin was sufficient to 
cover auction-related losses amounting to $1.2 
billion’. (King et al., 2020). LCH.Clearnet’s 
swapClear service provided nearly half of 
the world’s interest rate swap positions at 
the default time. While the unwinding took 
several months to reach an end, the trades 
managed by the LCH Clearnet handled the 
default efficiently within hours by suspending 
insolvent Lehman entities and having around 
usd 2 billion as an initial margin account 
from Lehman time (Gregory, 2014, Norman, 
2011). The LCH.Clearnet faced massive 
failures before, like the default of Barings in 
1995, which was handled without any severe 
problems (Gregory, 2014). McPartland and 
Lewis (2017) point out further examples of 
Table 1
Bilateral versus central clearing on otc markets
Source: Hull, 2018, pp. 57.
CCP
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clearing member defaults resulting in massive 
losses but not having Armageddon-like effects 
on the whole system. every example shows the 
advantages of CCPs and proves that they are 
shock-resistant and can protect the system they 
clear. The last event that had a higher impact 
on the clearing activity was in september 2018 
on the swedish market, but the event also 
endorsed the CCP and its advantage. (King 
et al. 2020). Béres (2018) also higlights the 
benefits of CCPs and its overall positive effects 
on the economy. 
There are several advantages and 
disadvantages of CCP clearing from a CCP’s 
perspective compared to bilateral trading 
without a CCP. The essential advantage 
of central clearing, on the first hand, is 
transparency. its offsetting benefits, loss 
mutualization through the default fund give 
heightened resistance for the market and its 
participants. On the other hand, legal and 
operational efficiency is also achieved while 
liquidity and default management are an 
overall advantage of the CCP’s presence on the 
market (Gregory, 2014), and risk mitigation 
concerning counterparty risk is achieved (iCe, 
2021). While the main disadvantages include 
moral hazard; adverse selection; bifurcation; 
procyclicality; assets are less effective for 
hedging if they have to be centrally cleared. 
The perspective of traders is vital to be noted 
as well because among the disadvantages CCPs 
have are that they are more costly than bilateral 
clearing without a CCP; only highly liquid 
assets can be used as collaterals. some factors 
are ambiguous, whether they are advantages 
or disadvantages of central clearing (turing, 
2012). 
The increased level of interoperability 
among CCPs intensifies systemic risk without 
enhancing the financial resources of each 
interoperating CCP. Duffie and Zhu (2011), 
Amini et al. (2016), Lopez and Saeidinezhad 
(2017), Health et al. (2016), Gullo (2020), 
Tywoniuk (2020), and several others are 
primarily concerned with the potential 
for contagion due to their high level of 
interconnectedness. King et al. (2020) address 
the problem from a procyclicality point of 
view. Baker (2020), Huang and Takáts (2020) 
highlight the risks associated with the CCPs’ 
own capital included in the system and 
the incentives it can shape, which may be 
harmful to the whole system, significantly if 
incentives of clearing members and the CCP 
is misaligned. CCPs and market participants 
shall work together to assure the financial 
system’s resilience (Friesz, 2020).  Gregory 
(2014) states that CCPs convert counterparty 
risk into liquidity, operational and legal risk. 
A further disadvantage is that clearing 
through CCPs on the OtC markets is the 
assets’ maturity, liquidity, and complexity. if 
the positions opened for a short period, usually 
weeks to months, a CCP proves to be more 
effective as the OtC market’s assets. These 
have a considerable maturity that can even 
last for decades, so handling counterparty risk 
on futures and spot markets working with a 
shorter timeframe is more efficient than on the 
OtC market. (Gregory, 2014). For instance, a 
ten-year credit default swap is not uncommon 
in these markets (Murphy, 2013). Moreover, 
the exchange-traded assets are standardized, 
not too complicated, and liquid. so handling 
counterparty risk on OtC markets, where 
the assets are complex, traded volumes are 
not concentrated in highly liquid assets, is 
inefficient and too expensive to clear through a 
CCP. For example, a stressed market condition 
to close down a position can take some days 
because of illiquidity. it can also happen 
that for non-standardized and exotic OtC 
derivatives, central clearing is just not feasible. 
However, the most crucial reason against 
CCP central clearing is that the OtC markets 
are the central place of financial innovations 
and offer cost-effective and well-tailored risk 
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reduction products. Nevertheless, these new, 
non-standardized, or exotic products cannot 
be cleared by CCPs (Gregory, 2014).
Clearinghouses vs  
central counterparties
The primary role of clearinghouses and 
central counterparties is the clearing and 
the settlement of trades. The first significant 
difference is that a clearinghouse is operating 
on exchange markets, while CCPs can operate 
on exchange markets and OtC markets. 
Regarding the risk-overtaking mechanism, the 
CCP takes over the counterparty risk during 
trading, so there is a novation process by 
becoming the seller to every buyer and every 
seller, while a clearinghouse usually does not 
do this. so in the case of OtC CCPs, the two 
trading parties are no longer exposed to each 
other but only to the CCP, providing insurance 
against bilateral default risk (Biais et al., 2016). 
The netting of the transactions is different 
since a CCP always nets transactions, while 
clearinghouses do not necessarily. Another 
striking dissimilarity relates to the fact that 
in OtC CCPs, the trades are not necessarily 
cleared daily (Berlinger et al., 2016). Overall, 
every CCP has the activity of a clearinghouse, 
while not every clearinghouse can be regarded 
as a CCP (dNB, 2013).
it is critical to note that several margin 
notions are related to trading needing to 
be used appropriately: initial margin (iM), 
maintenance margin (MM), variation margin 
(VM), and margin call. The notions’ meaning 
may, depending on which margin is being 
referred to, securities margin, futures margin, 
or the CCP margin. securities margin is not 
in the scope of this paper, although it is also 
related to trading with the financial assets but 
has nothing to do with the clearing activity. 
This type of margin is a partial downpayment 
– usually up to 50%, regulated by Regulation T 
(Reg t, 2021) – of the financial asset’s price for 
the broker. The trader has to pay this amount 
to his broker and borrow the remaining 
amount from his broker to buy the financial 
assets, usually known as ‘buying on margin’ 
(CFA, 2017). 
Throughout this paper, futures margin is 
the margin calculated by clearinghouses only 
in exchange trading, while the CCP margin is 
calculated by the CCPs and can be used in the 
markets it clears (both exchange- and OtC 
trading). in both cases, the trader becomes 
a member of the system, and it will be a 
clearing member having an obligation to pay 
the variation margin and the initial margin 
imposed by the entity. 
The initial margin aims to limit the impact 
of a traders’ position and cover potential 
future costs a CCP or a clearinghouse may 
face in normal market conditions if it defaults. 
The value of the iM is usually based on a risk 
measure. For example, the eMiR framework 
formulates a set of rules a CCP must comply 
with, depending on which market the asset is 
cleared: on the OtC market should be enough 
to cover losses on a 99.5% significance level, 
with a 5-day liquidation period, while for 
the exchange-traded asset, 99% significance 
level, and 2-day liquidation period should be 
applied. The model shall contain a stressed 
time period, and the lookback period for 
estimating the parameters should 12 months. 
(eMiR, 2012, Rts, 2013). While the dFA is 
not as detailed as the eMiR regarding the iM 
model’s parameters, and it just quantifies the 
application of the 99% significance level (seC, 
2021a), it still requires a conservative sizing of 
the initial margin requirements. Moreover, 
another notable difference between the two 
regulations from the iM perspective is that 
eMiR emphasizes considering procyclicality 
– the iM should not be procyclical –, while 
dFA does not. 
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The first payment and the trading process 
of how the iM is requested in the futures 
margining and the CCP margining are different. 
Regarding the futures margining, the clearing 
member cannot enter into trading without 
paying the iM first (CMe Group, 2021a). 
Meanwhile, a CCP requires the initial margin 
payment after the first trading day is over, when 
the transactions are cleared (Hull, 2018). 
during bilateral trading, the payment of 
initial margin is not applied in most of the 
trades. BCBS-IOSCO (2015) states that the 
total initial margin on bilateral transactions 
not cleared by a CCP represents only 0.03% of 
the gross notional exposure in 2012. in 2011 a 
Working Group on Margin Requirements was 
formed to work out a margining framework 
on the bilateral trades. Based on this work, 
financial firms and systematically important 
non-financial institutions should use initial 
margins above a certain threshold, applying a 
99% significance level and a 10-day liquidation 
period (BCBs-iOsCO, 2015). 
Before the current regulatory framework 
has been worked out, variation margin was 
already required for OtC derivatives contracts. 
However, the calculation and exchange were 
not regulated, therefore it was often irregular 
or incomplete. The variation margin usually 
has to be paid daily if the open positions are 
mark-to-market, so the trader loses or gains 
on a specific trading day, depending on price 
movements and positions. in the case of the 
CCP margin, if the trader gains on the open 
position on a particular day, the trader has 
access to this amount and can withdraw the 
gained amount from the collateral account. if 
there is a loss on the position, an obligation is 
generated towards the CCP to pay this loss as 
a variation margin. As a result, the losses will 
increase the amount of collateral to be paid, 
while the gains decrease it.
The futures margin has a different way 
of operation when the clearing of the actual 
loss/profit generates. if the trader has a loss/
profit when his position is marked-to-market, 
this loss/profit is subtracted/added to his 
actual margin account balance. if the loss is 
so extensive that this balance falls to the level 
– or below – a pre-set limit, the so-called 
maintenance margin, the trader will get a 
margin call. The margin call is the obligation 
of the trader to increase its margin account 
balance to the initial margin level, and this 
amount will be the variation margin. Overall, 
the variation margin needs to be paid to reach 
the margin account balance’s initial margin 
value (CMe Group, 2021a). Maintenance 
margin is not applied in the case of the CCP 
margin since, in most cases, there is a daily 
basis of marking-to-market and requiring the 
inclusion of collateral.
The notions described are the basics of 
futures margining and CCP margining on the 
individual financial assets’ level. every CCP or 
clearinghouse can apply different calculation 
methodologies. For example, they are free to 
set the parameters of the iM model or the risk 
measure they use. Also, the application of the 
calculated iM value to define the final collateral 
value may differ. An example of this is the CMe 
Group’s standard Portfolio Analysis of Risk 
(sPAN) methodology, which defines the margin 
on a portfolio level (CMe Group, 2021b). 
several CCPs, outside the us, use this approach 
besides CMe Group, e.g., LCH Clearnet (LCH.
Clearnet, 2021), KeLeR CCP Ltd, the CCP of 
Hungary (KeLeR CCP, 2021)., KdPW CCP, 
the Polish CCP (KdPW 2021).
Clearing in the USA and the EU
There are 19 CCPs in the eu from 15 
different countries (eACH, 2021) with the 
eMiR recognition for providing clearing and 
settlement services on exchanges and OtC 
markets in the european union. The supervisor 
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for all of them is their national supervisor, e.g., 
the national bank and the european securities 
Market Authority (esMA) on the eu level. it 
is important to note that not only an eu-based 
country can get eMiR recognition (esMA, 
2021). if a CCP proves that its operation and 
risk management process is prudent enough, 
it can achieve an eMiR license. Moreover, 
the european Commission and the CFtC 
agreed on a common approach to cross-border 
processes. The announcement made on 10th 
February 2016 permits derivatives clearing 
organizations (dCOs) and CCPs to clear 
derivatives for counterparties abroad. (doyle, 
2016). today, in the usA, six CCPs clear 
the most important us financial markets, 
five of which are designated as systemically 
important financial institutions, supervised 
by the seC. Besides the six institutions, non-
us clearinghouses, the iCe Clear europe 
Limited and the LCH sA (seC, 2021b) also 
belong under the seC’s supervision. The us 
regulatory framework, too, mutually accepts 
non-us CCPs with the condition to have as 
prudent and robust applied operation as the 
local one.
in sum, no matter which markets a trader 
chooses, CCPs or clearinghouses are designed 
to ensure that they will break contagion 
among their members and mitigate systemic 
risk across markets and economies. 
ModeL
Although jurisdictions differ and CCPs have 
the freedom to choose the best method to set 
up their daily operations, the primary purpose 
is prudence and consistency. This paper aims 
to show how different margin calculation 
methodologies can alter the results that 
quantify the same risk. The simulation shows 
how the margin calculation in the futures- 
and CCP margining work for a futures stock 
position. The following assumptions were 
implemented in the simulation. 
The logreturn of the stock follows 
arithmetic Brownian motion (ABM) based on 
Equation 1. 
dY=α ∙ dt+σ*√̄d̄t ∙ N (0,1) (1)
where ‘dY’ is the change in the logreturn 
during ‘dt’ period, α is the expected value 
of the logreturn, σ is the standard deviation 
for the logreturn, and ‘N(0,1)’ is a standard 
normal random variable. The expected value 
of the logreturn (7.71%) and the standard 
deviation (22.37%) were estimated from the 
dAX index’s time series data in the period of 
12th January 1991 and 11th January 2021. 
The simulated logreturn time series 
contained stressed periods as well. The 
occurrence of the stress is modeled with a 
Poisson process with a lambda parameter 
of 0.005, while the extent of the shock is 
modeled with a lognormal distribution with 
a mean of -10 and a standard deviation of 
2.25. The decay of the shock is modeled with 
a 0.97 parameter. Finally, the stock price is 
determined by Equation 2, where ‘t’ stands for 
time, and ‘s’ stands for the asset’s price. 
St=S0 ∙ e
Yt (2)
The prices are simulated for 500 days, from 
which the first 250 is used to define the initial 
margins input parameters, and the remaining 
250 days will be used to calculate the iM, VM, 
MM on a daily basis.
The initial margin is defined with the model 
proposed by Béli-Váradi (2017), which is 
based on the Value-at-Risk model and applies 
a 25% procyclicality buffer, which is exhausted 
if the exponentially weighted moving average 
(eWMA) standard deviation of the stock’s 
logreturn is more significant than its equally 
weighted standard deviation. This iM value 
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will be the same for both (futures and CCP) 
margining methods. 
The iM calculation follows the parameters 
such as the lookback period is 250 days; the 
significance level is 99%; the liquidation 
period is two days; the lambda parameter of 
the eWMA standard deviation is 1%. 
The maintenance margin will be 75% of the 
actual day’s initial margin value.
Assumptions regarding handling the gains 
and losses of the marked-to-market valuation 
will be different, based on how it works in 
practice. in both cases, the assumption is that 
the marked-to-market valuation happens on a 
daily basis after the closing price is available 
on the market.
CCP margining: the variation margin 
requirement will be paid to the CCP if the 
trader had a loss on that day, while he will 
receive money back if he had a gain, so it will 
always have a cash flow effect. The margin 
account balance will always be the level of the 
initial margin. so if the initial margin’s value 
is changing, the clearing member will have to 
increase/decrease the margin account balance. 
Futures margining: if the trader makes 
a loss, it will be subtracted from the margin 
account balance till the maintenance margin 
is lower than this balance, so it will not have 
an actual cash flow effect. if its MM is higher, 
the trader will get a margin call and will have 
an obligation to increase the margin account 
balance to the iM level. if the trader makes 
a gain, it will increase the margin account 
balance, but only till the level of the initial 
margin requirement. if the balance has reached 
the initial margin value, the surpluses can be 
taken away by the clearing member. 
resuLts
The simulations were carried out 1  000 
times. Table 1 and Table 2 shows one of the 
realizations’ results. A 10-day sample of a 
simulated margin calculation series can be seen 
in the tables, which show the iM, MM, VM, 
margin call, and cash flow dynamics. The main 
goal with the simulation was to show how the 
margin account and how the cash flows paid/
received by the clearing member change over 
time if the clearing member has a long open 
position in the stock futures positions. The 
risk-free return is assumed to be 0%, so the 
futures price will be equal to the spot price of 
the underlying stock. 
By analyzing and comparing the cash flows 
first (last column of Table 1 and Table 2), it 
can be stated that the futures margining has 
an advantage over the CCP margining. This 
benefit comes from the fact that it does not 
necessarily have a cash-flow effect every 
day, which is good from a daily liquidity 
management perspective. it is also shown in 
Figure 2, where one realization can be seen for 
250 trading days. The Figures show the same 
pattern as Tables 1 and 2. it is essential to see 
that there was less cash-flow in the futures 
margining since the losses did not have a cash-
flow effect unless the trader has received a 
margin call (green line) or realized gain above 
the initial margin. in contrast, in the CCP 
margining case, there was a cash-flow every 
day because of the daily variation margin or 
because the initial margin changes.
Regarding the margin account, the 
difference is notable since, in the case of 
the CCP margining, it is relatively stable 
compared to the futures margining case, 
where this account is changing from day 
to day because of the marked-to-market 
valuation. Moreover, in the case of the futures 
margining, the value of the margin account is 
always lower or equal to the margin account 
of the CCP margining, so it provides less 
security. in sum, the futures margining is 
better from a liquidity management point 
of view, but the ‘price’ of this is less secure. 
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Table 1
simulated margin account and cash flows in case  

















251 1241 70.00 15.00 15.00 70.00 52.50 0.00 –70.00
252 1224 70.00 –17.10 –2.10 52.90 52.50 0.00 0.00
253 1213 70.00 –11.02 –13.11 41.89 52.50 28.11 0.00
254 1211 70.00 –1.21 –14.33 68.79 52.50 0.00 –28.11
255 1229 70.00 17.56 3.23 70.00 52.50 0.00 16.34
256 1234 70.00 5.37 8.60 70.00 52.50 0.00 5.37
257 1219 70.00 –14.96 –6.36 70.00 52.50 0.00 0.00
258 1174 70.00 –45.11 –51.48 31.64 52.50 38.36 0.00
259 1171 70.00 –3.36 –54.84 66.64 52.50 0.00 –38.36
260 1183 70.00 11.59 –43.25 70.00 52.50 0.00 8.23
Note: the underlying asset's initial value is 1000 units
Source: Own editing 
Table 2
simulated margin account and cash flows in case of the ccP margining
ccP margin
day stock price initial margin variation margin margin account cash flows
251 1241 70.00 15.00
252 1224 70.00 –17.10 70.00 –55.00
253 1213 70.00 –11.02 70.00 –17.10
254 1211 70.00 –1.21 70.00 –11.02
255 1229 70.00 17.56 70.00 –1.21
256 1234 70.00 5.37 70.00 17.56
257 1219 70.00 –14.96 70.00 5.37
258 1174 70.00 –45.11 70.00 –14.96
259 1171 70.00 –3.36 70.00 –45.11
260 1183 70.00 11.59 70.00 –3.36
Source: Own editing 
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Figure 3 shows the time series of the margin 
accounts for 250 days.
The difference between the CCP and futures 
margining is important from a procyclicality 
point of view since when prices are falling, 
it usually happens when a shock hits the 
market. if the margin requirements increase 
when there is a shock and prices are falling, 
it is not as efficient from the traders’ point of 
view and can easily cause liquidity problems to 
finance the increasing collateral requirements. 
interestingly, in the case of the CCP margin, 
the notable point is to handle procyclicality 
throughout defining the iM in the eMiR 
framework; meanwhile, futures margining 
does not focus on this phenomenon. At 
the same time, the futures margin account 
decreases with the falling prices, while the 
CCP margin account does not decrease. 
Moreover, on those days when the prices all 
falling, the trader on the CCP cleared market 
has to pay the losses as variation margin, so 
it has to provide extra liquidity, while in the 
case of the futures margining it does not 
have to do so unless it reaches the level of the 
maintenance margin.
Besides liquidity and procyclicality issues – 
from which viewpoint the futures margining 
proves to be better –, there are other essential 
characteristics of the margin balance, which are 
more critical than liquidity and procyclicality, 
namely how good and prudent the model is. 
This can be quantified by the backtest, which 
compares a certain day’s price change to the 
margin account balance: whether the margin 
was enough to cover the price change.
Figure 4 shows the result of the relative 
frequency of the backtest results. Results 
show that the CCP margin in 22.5% of the 
cases was enough to cover losses every day 
Figure 2
cash-flows from the clearing memBer’s Point of view
Source: Own editing 
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Figure 3
margin account Balances
Source: Own editing 
CCP – Margin account balance Futures – Margin account balance Price
Figure 4
Backtest results
Source: Own editing 
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throughout the 250 days, for which the margin 
was simulated, while in the futures margining 
case, this is only 12.6%. since the VaR model 
was calibrated on the 99% significance level, 
it was expected to have most of the results 
around 1%. The cumulative frequency till 
the 1% backtest result is around 70% of the 
CCP margining case1 and only around 60% 
of the futures margining case. so it can be 
stated that the CCP margining is better from 
a backtesting point of view. Although in 1.3% 
of the simulated cases, the futures margin 
was better from a backtesting perspective. in 
contrast, the CCP margining was superior 
in 39.5% of the cases, and in the rest of the 
simulations, the two methods backtest had the 
same results, according to Table 3.
Although CCP margin performed much 
better than the futures margin from a 
backtesting point of view, it is also important 
that which margining method is stricter from 
the overmargining point of view. if the margin 
is always unreasonably too high, it is easy to 
have a good backtest result, which is good 
from a risk management point of view, but not 
necessarily good from the clearing members’ 
since it takes away too much liquidity from 
them. Also, the CCP may have a competitive 
disadvantage if it is too expensive, requires too 
much collateral. The overmargining is defined 
as the ratio of the margin account a certain day 
and the actual price change, so how many times 
did the margin cover the possible losses. The 
ratio was quantified for all 250 days, and the 
average of these values in every simulation was 
used. Figure 5 contains the relative frequency 
of these average overmargining values. On the 
x-axis, is shown how many times the margin 
value exceeded the price changes, while the 
y-axis contains the relative frequency of these 
possible outcomes. On the 20-time, the 
futures margin was more frequent, while on 
a higher level, the CCP margining is usually 
more frequent. This result means that in the 
futures margining case, the overmargining was 
on a lower level. Table 4 presents how many 
times the CCP margin was best and how many 
times the futures margining excelled. Better in 
this sense means that the overmargining was 
lower. so from this point of view, the futures 
margining was better.
Overall, the CCP margining performed 
better from a compliance aspect since the 
backtesting results gave more satisfying re-
sults. However, from the clearing members’ 
perspective, this leads to higher margin 
requirements, so overmargining and, there-
fore, extracting liquidity from the market is 
a disadvantage. The futures margin model 
performed better from a procyclicality, bur-
dening the members less but putting more 
risk on the CCP. 
ConCLusion
Our results show that calculating the margin 
balance with the futures margining or the 
Table 3
comParision of the Backtest results
Backtest result
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CCP margining can lead to a much different 
margin account balance, although the initial 
margin requirements were calculated the same 
way. The simulation was run 1  000 times. 
The main result was that from an everyday 
liquidity management point of view regarding 
cash flow movements and overmargining, the 
futures margining is better from the clearing 
members’ perspective. Moreover, also from a 
procyclicality aspect, the futures margining 
proved to be better. Nevertheless, the overall 
results show that the CCP margin was better 
from the model adequacy perspective. Namely, 
it performed much better on the backtest, so 
from a prudency perspective, it is superior.
Future proposed research regarding 




Source: Own editing 
Relative frequency – Overmargining CCP Relative frequency – Overmargining Futures
Table 4
comParision of the overmargining
overmargining
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Note
1 The reason why these values are not around 
99%, is coming from the margin calculation 
methodology of Béli-Váradi (2017), where there 
would be additional buffers applied in order to 
have an adequate back test result, whic buffer are 
set to 0% in this calculation. These buffers are the 
liquidity and expert buffer. 
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